Robert Solomon’s Rejection of Aristotelian Virtue: Is the Passion of Erotic Love a Virtue that is Independent of Rationality? by Silverman, Eric J.
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 12
Issue 1 Love and Reasons Article 3
January 2011
Robert Solomon’s Rejection of Aristotelian Virtue:
Is the Passion of Erotic Love a Virtue that is
Independent of Rationality?
Eric J. Silverman
Christopher Newport University, drericsilverman@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
Silverman, Eric J. (2011) "Robert Solomon’s Rejection of Aristotelian Virtue: Is the Passion of Erotic Love a Virtue that is
Independent of Rationality?," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 12: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Essays Philos (2011) 12:18-31                                                    1526-0569  | commons.pacificu.edu/eip 
 
Robert Solomon’s Rejection of Aristotelian Virtue:  Is 
the Passion of Erotic Love a Virtue that is Independent 
of Rationality? 
 
 
Eric J. Silverman 
 
Published online: 11 January 2011 
© Eric J. Silverman 2011 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
A recurring theme within Robert Solomon’s writings concerns the central importance of the passions. His 
high regard for the passions even motivates him to challenge the traditional understanding of virtue. 
Solomon rejects the Aristotelian view that virtues are dispositions of character developed according to 
rational principles rather than passions. He offers the counter-example of erotic love as a passion that is 
not based upon rationality, which he argues ought to be viewed as a virtue. This paper argues that while 
Solomon’s account of love can accommodate the traditional Aristotelian motivations for rejecting 
passions as virtues, there are compelling reasons for preferring the Aristotelian account of virtue. 
Ultimately, Solomon’s argument relies upon an implausible view of the passions and offers inferior 
resources for examining love in terms of virtue. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A recurring theme within Robert Solomon’s writings concerns the central importance 
of the passions. His high regard for the passions even motivates him to challenge the 
traditional understanding of virtue. Solomon rejects the Aristotelian view that virtues 
are dispositions of character rather than passions. He explains, “This is the claim I want 
to pursue here, that passions as such can be virtues . . . . I do not deny that virtues are 
typically states of character (or for that matter, that passions can be states of character), 
but it seems to me that passions (such as love) can also be virtues.”1 Against the 
Aristotelian view he argues that the passions should play a larger role in ethical theory 
and that passions can even be virtues. In doing so, Solomon detaches both the concept 
of virtue in general and the virtue of love in particular from the role that rationality 
plays in traditional Aristotelian virtue theories.  
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Since Aristotle’s views inform many contemporary accounts of virtue ethics Solomon’s 
position also conflicts with contemporary Neo-Aristotelian views that portray moral 
virtues as dispositions of an agent’s moral character that are shaped by rationality.2 
While Aristotelian portrayals of virtue offer a role for passions, since virtue includes a 
disposition towards experiencing passions in excellent ways, they reject Solomon’s 
view that passions can constitute virtue. He argues that such accounts of virtue attribute 
inadequate importance to the passions.3
 
 
I argue that while Solomon’s account of love anticipates and has some resources for 
responding to the traditional Aristotelian motivations for rejecting passions as virtues, 
there are additional compelling reasons for preferring an Aristotelian account of virtue 
over Solomon’s. I will demonstrate that Solomon’s argument relies upon an unorthodox 
view of the passions and that he offers inferior resources for examining love in terms of 
virtue. Furthermore, Solomon’s position has the undesirable implication that there can 
be no objective ‘reasons for love’ beyond the radically subjective choices of one’s own 
will.  
 
Section I discusses the relationship between Solomon’s account of love and the broader 
debate concerning the connection between love and rationality. Section II presents 
Solomon’s portrayal of the passion of eros as a virtue. Section III presents the 
traditional Aristotelian arguments for viewing dispositions developed in accordance 
with reason, rather than passions, as virtues. Section IV demonstrates that Solomon’s 
view addresses the traditional Aristotelian critique, but has other weaknesses. Section V 
concludes that Solomon‘s account of passions as virtues is ultimately less attractive 
than an Aristotelian account. 
 
 
I. The Reasons for Love 
 
Solomon’s account of love has implications for several debates in contemporary ethics. 
The most obvious implication is its potential to undermine the traditional Aristotelian 
account of virtue, which claims virtue is constituted by dispositions shaped by the 
dictates of rationality. However, Solomon’s account also implies that there is no 
rationale for guiding love apart from the subjective volitional choices of the lover. 
Therefore, there can be no objective rational assessment of one’s loves. This 
implication is more obvious once one compares various accounts of love based on the 
reasons they give for love.  
 
Four broad views of the connection between reasons and love can be identified in 
contemporary theories. First, some theories argue that a rational basis for love is located 
in a generic trait held by all humans such as rational capacities, personhood, or being 
created in the image of God. The most intricate example of such a theory is J. David 
Velleman’s account, which is a Neo-Kantian presentation of love as a moral emotion 
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based upon the lover’s ability to perceive the beloved’s personhood.4
 
 Therefore, the 
reason for love is the beloved’s enduring personhood and rational capacities. One 
implication of Velleman’s theory is that all humans are appropriate subjects for love 
and that; therefore, love should not result in immoral favoritism. However, the most 
serious challenge facing theories of this type of theory is the need to explain why the 
lover does not care for all people in precisely the same way as one another since they 
all share the trait that provides the rational basis for love. 
A second group of theories identify a rational basis for love in the specific non-
relational attributes of the beloved such as the beloved’s character, intelligence, sense 
of humor, or physical attractiveness. If one interprets Aristotle’s account of the various 
kinds of friendship as a theory of love, the rationality of love would be based on the 
beloved’s useful, pleasant, or virtuous traits with virtue being the ideal reason for love.5 
Several contemporary theories of love offer similar accounts such as Hugh LaFollette’s 
account of love in Personal Relationships.6
 
 While many people find this account of 
love intuitive, the most serious challenge facing these theories is their difficulty 
explaining the tenacity of love. If such traits are the basis for love, then isn’t it rational 
for the beloved to ‘trade-in’ the beloved for another individual whom possess similar 
traits in greater degrees? Similarly, why does love often continue even after attractive 
features of the beloved fade? 
 A third group of theories claim that love is rationally justified by the relationship the 
beloved has with the lover. The most influential contemporary version of this theory 
has been advanced by Niko Kolodny. He claims, “Love is not only rendered 
normatively appropriate by the presence of a relationship. Love moreover partly 
consists in the belief that some relationship renders it appropriate….Special concern for 
a person is not love at all when there is no belief that a relationship renders it 
appropriate.”7
 
 This view grounds love in the relational attributes possessed by the 
beloved. Such theories of love avoid many problems associated with accounts that find 
a reason for love in specific non-relational attributes, since there is no chance that 
anyone will possess the traits that rationally justify love in greater degrees than the 
beloved. No one will possess the trait of ‘being my oldest child’ or ‘being my spouse’ 
more than my oldest child or spouse. Yet, while this theory offers a very plausible 
account for why love is justified once such a relationship is established, it offers little 
insight concerning why we initiate loving relationships where no significant 
relationship already exists.  
Finally, there are theories that claim that there is no standard rational structure that 
grounds love. One influential example of such a theory is offered by Harry Frankfurt 
who argues that love serves as a rational reason for valuing the beloved, but that no 
existing value within the beloved serves as a rational reason for love.8 As we will see, 
Solomon’s account of love is best understood as a ‘no reasons’ theory of love, since the 
basis of love is passion rather than reason.9 Indeed, part of what he lauds about the 
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passions is their independence from reason.10 However, since he will ultimately portray 
passions as a type of volitional judgment which is not necessitated by reason, love will 
ultimately be based upon the lover’s radically subjective choice.11 Therefore, if 
Solomon’s theory is correct then love is based upon no rational structure beyond the 
subjective choices of the individual lover expressed through the passions.12
 
  
 
II. Solomon’s Passion Based Virtue of Erotic Love 
 
Solomon presents eros as a paradigm example of a passion that is a virtue. He claims 
that ethical systems ought to account for the passion of love in terms of virtue. He 
argues: 
 
A passion as a virtue not only need not be a disposition of character; it 
may even be “out of character” and quite contrary to anything that one 
might usually expect of this person. “Falling in love” and stress-induced 
acts of heroism often exemplify such “lapses.” Indeed, such examples 
are more than convincing reasons to seriously consider passions, even 
rather than dispositions of character, as virtues.13
 
  
Solomon’s insight is that some virtuous human experiences are rare and are therefore 
difficult to portray as any kind of disposition. Therefore, he concludes that even an 
action or passion that is ‘out of character’ for an agent could be a virtue. In order to 
acknowledge the excellence of these actions, emotions, and passions Solomon claims 
that they should be reclassified as virtues.  
 
Solomon attempts to address the traditional motivations for rejecting passions as 
virtues. One of Aristotle’s objections to viewing passions as virtues is that he portrays 
passions as involuntary and irrational. Solomon explains, 
 
It is sometimes said that emotions in general, and love in particular, are 
irrational, and therefore cannot be virtues because they are capricious. 
They simply come and go. They are all contingency without rational 
necessity and the constancy of reason.14
 
  
Solomon claims the traditional reluctance against viewing love in ethical terms is based 
in its seemingly capricious and involuntary nature. However, he argues that love is not 
as capricious as is often thought15 and that love’s failure to respond to reason is part of 
its strength.16 Accordingly, he rejects the view that passions are short-term and short-
lived. He attributes this view to Aristotle saying, “Aristotle assumes that passions are 
fleeting, a common assumption.”17 Instead, he claims that passions can express long-
term devotion. He describes such passions,  
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. . . love tends to build on itself, to amplify with time; one tends to 
find—through love—ever more reasons to love. This is not, I would 
argue, an argument against the emotions, but rather an aspect of their 
virtue. It is passing fancy that we criticize, not unmovable devotion. It is 
sudden anger that we call irrational, not long-motivated and well-
reasoned animosity…It is true that the emotions are stubborn and 
intractable, but this—as opposed ultimately less dependable action in 
accordance with principle—is what makes them so essential to ethics.18
 
 
  
Solomon accepts that immature passions are not virtues, but insists that these vices are 
no reason to reject all passions as virtues. Concerning love, he admits that someone 
who “falls in love” with a different person each week has immature passions. This 
agent is vicious precisely because her passions are inconsistent ‘passing fancies’ rather 
than long-term devotion. For Solomon, love is not responsive to reason, but instead the 
rationales the lover provides for love are ad-hoc justifications rooted in passion. Love 
itself is not based upon any reason at all, but rather based upon passions through which 
one chooses to invest one’s self into another person.  
 
The closest Solomon comes to defining love is by describing it in terms of self-
definition. He explains, “Passions define the self, they are the heavy ‘investments’ of 
the self in a way that most emotions do not and are not. Love, notably, might be defined 
(in part) as defining yourself in and through another person.”19 He portrays love as a 
foundational aspect of the self, which is neither derivative nor secondary. However, he 
simultaneously acknowledges that love can be vicious and claims, “There is misplaced 
love, foolish love, overly possessive love (which may be better characterized as 
jealousy), and these are not virtues or virtuous, although even a foolish love may 
display more virtue than no love at all.”20
 
 Yet, while Solomon suggests there are 
standards for distinguishing virtuous love from vicious love, he offers rather limited 
guidance for distinguishing one from the other. As we shall see, this difficulty is a 
logical implication of detaching love from rationality. Once Solomon embraces the 
view that there are no objective reasons for love, it becomes difficult to find a basis for 
distinguishing between virtuous and vicious love. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that Solomon’s argument that passions can be 
virtues relies upon an unusual view of psychology that construes passions as voluntary 
choices. He frequently uses the terms emotions and passions interchangeably and 
portrays them both as voluntary expressions of a person’s judgment. He offers this 
account of emotion:21
 
  
An emotion is a judgment (or a set of judgments), something we do. An 
emotion is a (set of) judgment(s) which constitute our world, our 
surreality, and its “intentional objects.” An emotion is a basic judgment 
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about our Selves and our place in our world, the projection of the values 
and ideals, structures and mythologies, according to which we live and 
through which we experience our lives.22
 
 
He construes emotions as judgments and minimizes the differences between them. For 
Solomon, emotions are the very judgments that shape the way we view the most 
important aspects of life such as the self and the world. These judgments are not 
demanded by reason, but stem from the agent’s volition. In contrast, he rejects the 
‘traditional position,’ which denies the agent’s role in shaping the passions. 
Accordingly, he claims that passions are the deep judgments of the self that reveal the 
individual’s true character. These judgments are foundational character traits, since 
they are ultimately voluntary expressions of the will.  
 
Solomon’s argument against the traditional account of virtue is based on the 
attractiveness of love as a counter-example of a passion that constitutes character 
excellence. Love displays excellence through its intense commitment to another person 
and entails a valuing of another that few other experiences can match. Solomon 
suggests that this experience ought to be viewed as an excellence and virtue despite its 
independence from rationality. 
 
 
III. The Aristotelian Rejection of Passion as a Virtue  
 
Aristotle’s account of virtue and its contemporary descendents define virtues as 
excellent character dispositions developed according to the dictates of rationality, but 
explicitly reject the idea that passions are virtues. Aristotle argues that each moral 
virtue can only be developed as irrational aspects of the psyche are shaped according to 
the guidance of rationality. For example, the virtue of courage is an ongoing disposition 
to fear only that which is truly dangerous in proportion to the threat it actually 
presents.23 Similarly, temperance is the ongoing disposition of one’s appetite to desire 
only that which is truly desirable in terms of health and long-term compatibility with 
happiness.24 In each case, irrational emotions, passions, and appetites need to be shaped 
by the wise and objective dictates of reason if they are to become virtuous.25
 
 
However, Aristotle explains that practical rationality is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for the development of virtue. In the Nicomachean Ethics he writes: 
 
This is why some say that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom, 
and why Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another 
he went astray; in thinking that all the virtues were forms of practical 
wisdom he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical wisdom he 
was right.26
 
  
Essays Philos (2011) 12:1                                                                                                  Silverman | 24 
 
 
Contrary to the Socratic doctrine that made virtue equivalent to rational understanding, 
the Aristotelian view portrays practical wisdom as a foundation for virtue while 
acknowledging that other contributors are also necessary. Most notably, the agent needs 
an adequately strong will to carry out the dictates of practical wisdom and develop a 
fully virtuous disposition long-term.27
 
  
Aristotle portrays the passions as an aspect of the self that ultimately need to be trained 
in accordance with practical rationality long-term. He explains, 
 
Now neither virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not called 
good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the 
ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised 
nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not 
praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who 
feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised 
or blamed.  
 
 Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or 
involve choice.28
 
  
Aristotle offers two explicit arguments against accepting passions as virtues. First, he 
argues that passions simpliciter are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy, but that the 
situational context surrounding emotions determines their value. Passions like anger, 
love, or fear reveal little about one’s character independent of the situational context of 
those passions. Sometimes it is virtuous to experience anger, love, or fear and 
sometimes it is vicious. Experiencing fear in proportion to the actual danger in a 
situation is virtuous while fear in the absence of genuine danger is vicious. Both agents 
experience fear, but one situation rationally warrants fear while the other simply does 
not. Therefore, the passion of fear constitutes neither virtue nor vice, but the deeper 
tendency to experience fear in appropriate or inappropriate situations constitutes virtue 
or vice. 
 
Aristotle’s second argument against viewing passions as virtues is that he views them 
as involuntary and therefore not morally relevant apart from the deeper context of a 
person’s character. An agent’s disposition towards experiencing passions properly or 
improperly is central to moral character. Yet, while passions themselves are largely 
involuntary, the moral agent’s underlying disposition inclining her towards 
experiencing passion in such situations is voluntarily developed over a lifetime. The 
ideal person has trained her dispositions to respond in line with rationality while the 
vicious person has not. 
 
In addition to Aristotle’s two overt arguments against viewing emotions as virtues, a 
third motivation for rejecting emotions as virtues is implicit in his endorsement of 
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dispositions as virtues. Emotions are viewed as derivative from more foundational 
character dispositions. Therefore, dispositions are portrayed as having primary ethical 
relevance while emotions are viewed as only secondarily relevant. Accordingly, 
passions examined apart from the context of an agent’s dispositions reveal little about 
the agent since any particular passion might represent a departure from her usual 
character.  
 
 
IV. Critiquing Solomon 
 
Is Solomon’s account of love and other non-rational virtues, more compelling than 
Aristotle’s account? At first glance, it may seem that Solomon has an advantage in this 
debate for he seems to have addressed Aristotle’s concerns. Aristotle’s first argument 
against viewing passions as virtues is that a person is not virtuous for simply 
experiencing certain emotions, but for experiencing emotions in appropriate ways 
during appropriate circumstances. Yet, Solomon acknowledges that love is only 
virtuous when it represents a long-term commitment to another through self-definition. 
Love is also not virtuous when it is misplaced, foolish, or overly possessive.29
 
 Since 
Solomon accommodates the intuition that not just any instance of erotic love is a virtue, 
his account is well positioned to avoid the full force of this objection.  
Solomon also addresses Aristotle’s other concerns. As we have seen, Solomon argues 
that passions are not involuntary experiences that derive from more foundational 
character qualities. Instead, he claims passions are voluntary judgments from the self. 
He rejects Aristotle’s portrayal of the passions as short-term, involuntary, and 
derivative from more foundational dispositions. Since Solomon rejects these claims 
about the passions upon which the Aristotelian objections against viewing passions as 
virtues are founded, it is unsurprising that he comes to a different conclusion 
concerning their status as virtues. While Solomon addresses the three traditional 
Aristotelian objections against viewing passions as virtues by offering a competing 
account of the passions, we are left with the question of whether Aristotle or Solomon’s 
account is more plausible.  
 
One difficulty for Solomon’s view is supporting his claim that passions are essentially 
voluntary judgments. While there is little doubt that passions reflect, express, or include 
a judgment of some sort it is difficult to see why anyone would view the essence of 
passion as voluntary judgment. There are plenty of instances when despite our best 
efforts towards personal wholeness our passions conflict with our intellectual 
judgments or conscious choices. We may be inexplicably sad or depressed despite a 
fully positive evaluation of our lives. We may fail to be romantically attracted to 
someone despite our judgment that she is an attractive person. We may be deathly 
afraid of common spiders despite our knowledge that they are relatively harmless. In 
such cases, our passions tell us something that we do not voluntarily endorse or even 
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deliberately reject. Perhaps, such passions reveal an internal conflict, but such conflict 
is not simply a disagreement between judgments.  
 
Second, even if passions include judgments, many aspects of these judgments are 
clearly influenced by involuntary factors. Passions are influenced by factors beyond our 
volition such as the amount of oxygen in our bloodstream, the amount of dopamine in 
our brain, values that are inculcated in our early upbringing, and whether we are 
adequately rested. Such factors help motivate contemporary psychology’s willingness 
to include a pharmaceutical treatment of emotional disorders. Counselors prescribe 
anti-depressants and similar drugs because they acknowledge that many people cannot 
simply choose to stop experiencing undesirable passions, since these passions are 
thought to have at least a partial physical cause. 
 
Furthermore, Solomon underestimates the superior resources Aristotle offers for 
addressing erotic love and distinguishing between virtuous and vicious love. First, we 
should notice that Aristotle, unlike many modern act-centered ethicists, views the 
passions as morally relevant. Aristotelian virtues are not merely dispositions towards 
externally acting in a certain ideal manner, but also towards experiencing ideal internal 
passions, emotions, and motivations before, during, and after right actions.30
 
 
Aristotle has at least two kinds of resources for distinguishing between virtuous and 
vicious love. First, his distinction between useful, pleasant, and virtuous relationships 
can be used to distinguish between virtuous and less than virtuous erotic loves.31 
Aristotle himself uses these categories to describe ideal marriages in terms of 
friendships of virtue.32
 
 Surely, erotic relationships more generally can be classified 
based on whether they occur within friendships of utility, pleasure, or virtue just like 
other relationships. He explains,  
Now these reasons differ from each other in kind; so, therefore, do the 
corresponding forms of love and friendship. There are therefore three 
kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are loveable; for 
with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love, and those 
who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they 
love one another. Now those who love each other for their utility do not 
love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get 
from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it 
is not for their character that men love readywitted people, but because 
they find them pleasant. Therefore those who love for the sake of utility 
love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for 
the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, 
and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is 
useful or pleasant. And thus these friendships are only incidental; for it 
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is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as 
providing some good or pleasure.33
 
  
Using these three categories of relationships, a person’s character within erotic 
relationships can be viewed in the broader context of all of a person’s relationships. If a 
lover habitually seeks relationships of utility, pleasure, or virtue and continues this 
pattern within erotic relationships then this broader disposition towards relationships is 
morally relevant. It would be unsurprising if someone who consistently prefers pleasant 
rather than virtuous friends continues to express this disposition as he chooses a lover. 
Since we can evaluate a person’s choices in erotic relationships within the broader 
context of relational choices in general, this fact eliminates the ‘rarity’ of erotic 
relationships that Solomon uses to establish the passion of love as a virtue.  
 
A second way that erotic love can be analyzed in terms of broader Aristotelian traits is 
by focusing upon the lover’s disposition towards physical and emotional desires more 
generally. Some vicious agents uncritically embrace each and every desire they 
experience whether or not these desires are prudent. A pattern of intemperance and 
poor handling of desires in general can be identified in such agents. It would be 
unsurprising if this intemperate character disposition was similarly expressed within 
romantic relationships. In contrast, it is unsurprising when a careful, temperate person 
displays those same traits in erotic relationships. 
 
Finally, we can identify patterns in the way agents handle desires related to romantic 
attraction even when such desires do not lead to romantic relationships. Any evaluation 
of an underlying disposition concerning erotic relationships must be informed not only 
by examining the erotic relationships an individual pursues, but also by examining both 
the potential erotic relationships an individual chooses not to pursue as well as the 
potential partners he experiences no attraction towards at all. Some agents are too quick 
to embrace such desires and habitually follow them regardless of the desires’ prudence, 
wisdom, or objective goodness. Aristotle might accept that Solomon’s agent who 
experiences a unique passionate, intractable, long-term love towards another is 
virtuous, but he would be quick to point out that such love is not really ‘out of 
character’ for the virtuous lover since she may possess a disposition to handle attraction 
well which has previously been demonstrated by avoiding many foolhardy 
relationships. Such lovers are better able to embrace positive relationships when the 
opportunity comes about in part because they have avoided foolish entanglements. 
Therefore, while ‘falling in love’ may be rare there is a broader personal history that the 
Aristotelian can use to examine the lover’s underlying disposition.  
 
In comparison, Solomon’s resources for distinguishing between virtuous and vicious 
love are more limited. He acknowledges that love is not a virtue when it is misplaced, 
foolish, or overly possessive. Yet, consider the concept of misplaced love. For Solomon 
love is an act of voluntary self-definition. It is through voluntary passions like love that 
Essays Philos (2011) 12:1                                                                                                  Silverman | 28 
 
 
one constructs her reality. Therefore, the idea of misplaced love seems impossible by 
definition. The passions construct and define the self and reality; therefore, there are no 
further rational criteria to appeal to in order to determine that love is misplaced. While 
misplaced love seems to be a genuine experience, Solomon’s view lacks resources to 
explain this phenomenon.  
 
Similarly, consider Solomon’s claim that the passion of erotic love can be viciously 
foolish. Surely, love always includes prudential risks, but this concern cannot be what 
he means by ‘foolish’ love since this criterion would rule out all love as vicious. He 
also cannot mean that foolish love is irrational, since he has already argued that its 
‘irrationality’ is part of love’s excellence.34 Perhaps, he means that some instances of 
love entail extraordinary prudential risks and are therefore vicious. However, if an 
agent judges through her passions that love is worth extraordinarily high prudential 
risks, it is difficult to see what objective criterion Solomon might appeal to in order to 
establish that love’s viciousness. Furthermore, it is unclear why Solomon would view 
such prudential risks as inherently vicious. While Aristotle views prudentially risky 
love as vicious based on his claim that prudence is a central virtue,35 Solomon should 
not since he portrays love’s uncertainty,36 intractability, and non-responsiveness to 
reasons, including prudential reasons, as part of its virtuousness.37
 
  
Therefore, Solomon is left with over-possessiveness as a criterion for identifying 
vicious love. While most of us are likely to grant that over-possessiveness is a genuine 
phenomenon and that it is vicious, it is unclear what resources Solomon’s view 
possesses in order to identify such jealousy since it cannot be determined by objective 
reason. Perhaps, it could be defined inter-subjectively. Since love is self-definition, it is 
plausible that over-possessive love occurs when one partner loves in a significantly 
more bonded way that the other. Such love is overly possessive in comparison to the 
beloved’s much lower degree of bondedness. Yet, even if we grant that Solomon can 
offer a plausible account of over-possessiveness, this criterion only identifies a single 
sufficient condition for vicious love, leaving Solomon with few resources for 
distinguishing virtuous love from vicious love.  
 
However, we can identify many people with whom love would seem to be vicious: 
passionate love experienced towards an underling, someone under the age of consent, a 
blood relative, someone who is already in a committed relationship, someone who 
despises us, someone who is hopelessly vicious, etc. Furthermore, such loves are not 
vicious merely because they embody over-possessiveness but for a variety of reasons: 
love in such circumstances may be bad for the beloved, it may threaten the beloved’s 
autonomy, it may be harmful to a third party with whom the beloved already has a 
mutually fulfilling relationship, it may be prudentially foolish, etc. Aristotelian views 
can take a wider variety of considerations into account when deeming a love as 
‘virtuous’ or ‘vicious’ due to its emphasis on objective practical rational. Therefore, 
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Solomon’s account of virtue has fewer resources than Aristotle’s for distinguishing 
between virtuous and vicious love.  
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Robert Solomon offers an interesting account of the passion of erotic love as a virtue 
that is based upon no reason beyond the subjective choices of the individual. While his 
account of love avoids the traditional Aristotelian criticisms that passions are 
involuntary, derivative, and only virtuous within appropriate contexts his account has 
other problems. His account relies upon a controversial view of moral psychology that 
portrays the passions as voluntary judgments. Furthermore, Solomon’s view offers 
substantially fewer resources than Aristotle’s for distinguishing between virtuous and 
vicious love.38
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